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John R. Martin
Round Table on  
‘Free and Frank Advice’ 
Summary of Discussion
The round table at which Professor Mulgan presented 
his paper was attended by over 40 participants, including 
past and present ministers, chief executives and senior 
managers, academics, independent researchers, observers 
and commentators. The discussion was conducted under the 
Chatham House Rule. The following is a summary record.
integrity – which underpin New Zealand’s 
reputation as being quite corruption-
free – are also significant. Advice from 
officials is expected to be ‘scrupulously 
accurate’ and to be balanced and 
unbiased in its assessment of evidence. 
These are also ‘academic values’. Professor 
Mulgan underlined in his presentation 
that he considered the New Zealand 
public service had retained elements of 
free and frank advice that had been lost 
elsewhere.
‘Free and frank advice’ is not a 
property only of the public service; others 
in positions of authority also expect their 
advisers to speak their minds freely. And 
ministers expect ‘free and frank advice’ 
from private advisers and community 
members. But officials operate within 
a distinctive framework in which the 
government makes the final decisions. 
Ministers depend, however, on the 
reliability of the advice of officials – on its 
factual accuracy and balanced judgement. 
Respect for truth and evidence is the key.
The policy function has been 
neglected in recent years, by comparison 
with concerns about public sector 
management. Recent reports by Scott 
in New Zealand and Moran in Australia 
(Review of Expenditure on Policy Advice, advice. Values such as impartiality and 
Professor Jonathan Boston (Institute 
for Governance and Policy Studies) and 
Len Cook (president of IPANZ) opened 
the round table. Cook noted that 2012 
was the centenary of the Public Service 
Act and that ‘free and frank advice’ was 
central to the ethos that was the legacy of 
that statute. Boston, as chairman, invited 
Emeritus Professor Richard Mulgan 
(Crawford School of Public Policy, 
Australian National University, Canberra) 
to introduce the discussion.
Setting the scene
Professor Mulgan said that ‘free and frank 
advice’ (‘frank and fearless’ in Australia) 
was a time-honoured catchphrase about 
which generalisation was difficult. Hard 
evidence was lacking and enquiry was 
largely based on anecdote. Experience 
varied across jurisdictions and he 
registered the caveat that he was not as up-
to-date about New Zealand as he would 
wish to be. In these introductory remarks 
he would explore the meaning of ‘free 
and frank advice’, discuss some current 
challenges, and reflect on possible lessons 
for the future.
‘Free and frank advice’ was a hallowed 
tradition under which officials are obliged 
to speak their minds openly and honestly 
and to tell ministers things that they may 
not wish to hear. But ‘free and frank’ is 
not the only feature of public service 
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2010; Advisory Group on Reform of 
Australian Government Administration, 
2010) have pointed to systemic weaknesses 
in policy advice, especially in relation 
to strategic long-term advice. One 
consideration in recent years affecting 
the standing of public service advice is 
that officials have not ‘had the ear’ of 
ministers to the extent that they have had 
previously. The increasing numbers of 
advisers in the ministers’ offices has been 
one contributing factor. Another has 
been the changing media cycle. The ‘24-
hour news cycle’ requires a commitment 
of time from ministers, increased reliance 
on media and tactical advisers, and less 
time for longer-term policy issues.
The public service does not have a 
monopoly on policy advice. Over recent 
decades ministers have made increasing 
use of external sources of advice: 
consultants, think tanks and interest 
groups. Public service advice is only one 
among several sources.
‘Evidence-based’ policy is in favour. 
The notion that policy can be a matter 
for political compromise among interests 
has less support and the language of 
research-based evidence is pervasive. 
One consequence is the strengthening 
of interest groups’ capacity – in-house 
experts and use of think tanks and 
consultants – to muster their own 
evidence-based arguments to promote 
their policy stances. What purports to be 
evidence-based policy can, however, be 
policy-based evidence. Options based on 
such selective evidence compete with the 
department’s advice.
Greater transparency promoted by 
the Official Information Act 1982 (the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 in 
Australia) also emphasises that public 
service advice is only ‘one among many’. 
The written advice of departments is 
likely to become available in the public 
arena, and may be seen to differ from the 
policy determined by the minister. Post-
election briefings are an example. 
The degree of openness now in place 
marks a significant change in the model 
of policy advice. The traditional model 
was a closed, tightly-controlled process 
in which ministers and departments 
presented a united front: public servants 
were ‘the insiders’. The new model is 
‘pluralistic’: public servants compete 
in an open marketplace of ideas with 
no assurance that their advice will be 
accepted. This requires a ‘meta-advice’ 
function, ‘advice on advice’: who assists 
the minister to choose from among 
the range of views advanced? Public 
servants, as trusted advisers loyal to the 
government, have the experience and 
information to play this role. There is a 
strong case for confidentiality in respect 
of ‘free and frank’ advice of this kind. 
Indeed, a distinction can drawn between 
(a) policy research and analysis by 
departments or external providers, where 
the pluralistic, open model is appropriate; 
and (b) advice considering policy options 
and making recommendations.
This situation requires a revisiting of 
the official information legislation. In the 
adversarial Westminster system there is a 
strong case for confidentiality in respect 
of politically sensitive meta-advice. This 
is a contentious issue. In Australia, recent 
statutory changes have ruled out political 
embarrassment for the government as 
an acceptable reason for withholding 
disclosure of documents. On the other 
hand, United Kingdom legislation 
enables the withholding of ‘free and 
frank exchange of views for the purposes 
of deliberation’ (Freedom of Information 
Act 2000, s36 2(b)). The question is 
‘where to draw the line’. There is a need 
to balance the competing principles 
of, on the one hand, transparency and 
openness, and on the other the essential 
maintenance of trust between ministers 
and officials. 
There may be advantage in 
distinguishing between the department 
as a collective unit and the senior 
management. Unlike meta-advice, data 
and policy research produced by the 
department does not necessarily carry 
the imprimatur of the chief executive or 
senior management (or the minister) and 
should be in the public arena. That is part 
of the wider public debate, along with the 
work of arm’s-length organisations such 
as the Productivity Commission, who 
are also expected to speak ‘without fear 
or favour’. (And, like other markets, the 
marketplace of ideas cannot be effectively 
planned.)
No ‘golden age’
Discussion on Professor Mulgan’s remarks 
began with a caution that there was no 
‘golden age’ of policy advice, and that, 
relative to the size of the public service as 
a whole, the policy advice function, while 
clearly important, is not overwhelming in 
the day-to-day work of the public service. 
The drivers of change now are different 
from 30 years ago. Issues are much more 
complex: solutions cannot ‘be pulled off 
the shelf ’. Policies aiming to change the 
behaviour of citizens need to take into 
account the differing capabilities and 
interests in the community. The public 
service has to be more open.
A major challenge to the public service 
is to provide quality policy advice by 
leveraging the various sources of credible 
options available to ministers. The 
Land and Water Forum1 is an example 
of collaboration of interests in the 
policy process. It reflects the decreasing 
willingness of the community to accept 
‘tablets of stone’ handed down by the 
government of the day. There is also a 
requirement to work across ministerial 
portfolio areas and to provide policy 
advice for the longer term.
The official information setting is an 
important factor in the context in which 
policy advice is provided. It helps to 
shape the culture of a more transparent 
public service. But it also provides the 
basic material in the ‘war of attrition’ 
between the government of the day and 
A major challenge to the public service is to 
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the opposition, which has a slow but 
corrosive effect on the policy process. 
The focus tends to be on the provision of 
advice in the short term, with less priority 
for medium- and long-term issues. The 
public service has to adapt to the world 
as it is and to embrace experimentation.
‘Free and frank advice’ requires a high 
degree of trust between ministers and 
officials. Public servants have a privileged 
position; in return, they are expected to 
provide the advice ministers want. But 
the place of the public service is much 
less ‘monastic’ than in the traditional 
model. It has to see itself as much more 
outward-looking.
The imminent report of the Law 
Commission on the Official Information 
Act (OIA) would promote a conversation 
about practice in understanding of the 
processes of government, but the option 
of greater confidentiality is not open. The 
rules of engagement require the routine 
proactive release of information about 
ministerial decision making – but also 
a greater understanding on the part of 
those making requests.
Amendments to the State Sector Act 
1988 would be introduced shortly. One 
purpose would be to elaborate on the 
functions of chief executives beyond 
the requirement of the principal act, 
i.e. simply to tender advice. The chief 
executive has an obligation to ensure that 
the department has the capacity to deliver 
quality advice.
Evidence-based policy or policy-based 
evidence?
The impact of the media on the quality 
of free and frank advice was emphasised. 
The current Leveson enquiry in the 
United Kingdom has implications for 
New Zealand. Rational reasoning is 
central to policy making, but activists 
and even academics seek evidence to 
back their views. How do ministers and 
officials safeguard the quality of evidence 
on which decisions are made?
The OIA has had a ‘chilling effect’ 
on free and frank advice. A massive 
bureaucracy is needed to administer the 
OIA. The genie could not be put back in 
the bottle but there is a need for greater 
clarity about what constitutes ‘official 
information’. 
The relevance of the OIA to 
Parliament was raised. There would be 
strong opposition to any move to apply 
the Act to Parliament. Parliament is not 
part of executive government, and the 
application of the Official Information 
Act would bring it under rules specifically 
developed to oversee and monitor the 
executive. More important is the need for 
ministers and departments to strengthen 
their relationship in responding to 
parliamentary questions. Too often 
ministers are not provided with adequate 
information to respond adequately. 
The OIA as an incentive for quality advice
The positive effect of the OIA in ‘driving 
out bad advice’ was acknowledged. The 
duty of officials is to provide ‘factual and 
balanced’ advice that will stand up to 
public scrutiny. Sensitive political advice 
is adequately protected by the legislation 
(subject to the ombudsman’s agreement). 
Another participant urged caution in 
withholding information or ‘blacking 
out’ material: this results in further 
requests to the ombudsman. There could 
be greater clarity about what constitutes 
‘information’; the importance of ‘due 
particularity’ was emphasised.
It was suggested that the ‘logjam’ of 
OIA requests could be unblocked by a 
decision in principle to release all Cabinet 
decisions on a website after, say, two 
months – there would be a presumption 
of release. ‘Fishing expeditions’, often 
by the media, contribute to the logjam, 
but a case was made for their legitimacy 
as an instrument available to the 
opposition. Experience also suggests that 
the management of release, including 
timing, is relevant to the media interest 
in pursuing further inquiries.
Another way of reducing OIA 
pressures on the policy advice process is 
for ministers or their advisers to precede 
the advice stage with informal ‘green 
fields’ discussions. 
Attention was drawn to the different 
approaches of New Zealand and 
Australian official information legisla-
tion. Australia’s legislation is prescrip-tive, 
leading to more games being played. The 
New Zealand act is ‘principle-based’, with 
the trade-off between the presumption of 
availability and reasons for withholding 
acknowledged in the act. It was later noted 
that the New Zealand review procedure is 
simple – a request to the ombudsman – 
but one consequence is that there is not 
an extensive jurisprudence about the 
meaning of the act to guide the public. 
The ombudsman’s approach is, as with 
maladministration, to deal with the 
case. The Law Commission’s report may 
provide guidance and, it was suggested, 
there is a case for the executive (the State 
Services Commission?) to encourage the 
learning process. (Reference was made to 
the Information Authority set up under 
the OIA, but it has been disbanded.)
There seemed to be a consensus 
around the premise that the OIA could 
not be rolled back. But how had it 
affected free and frank advice? Had it 
encouraged oral advice? Had there been, 
as earlier suggested, a ‘chilling’ impact on 
policy advice?
One response was that there has been 
no effect. The ambit of the act extends 
beyond written advice to information 
‘in the head’. Another was that the onus 
is on the adviser to present balanced 
advice – ‘the pluses and minuses’ – on the 
assumption that it would be protected 
until it was appropriate to release. In 
response to the question as to whether the 
crucial factor was the relationship with 
the minister or the integrity of the public 
servant, the capacity of experienced 
practitioners was underlined. The point 
was made that oral advice lacks the 
 [T]he ‘logjam’ of OIA requests could be unblocked 
by a decision in principle to release all Cabinet 
decisions on a website after, say, two months ...
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discipline of written advice, and it was 
noted that the style of written advice 
has changed in some respects: emphasis 
is given to the presentation of options. 
There is also experience of advice being 
rewritten to align with the decision 
already made.
One aspect of the relationship 
between free and frank advice and the 
OIA is the treatment of injudicious 
comments (often by email) between 
officials and across departments. Ill-
considered, flippant emails carry risks. 
The way in which the act affects staff 
varied. Some are too cautious; others too 
casual. The importance of oral briefings 
on sensitive topics was emphasised. And 
the value of informal group meetings, 
already mentioned, in which the minister 
is a participant was endorsed. 
Proactive advice
Proactive advice to ministers by 
departments can present difficulties. The 
process of policy-making is changing. 
The new emphasis on results will require 
change. There is a need for a more 
dynamic process involving advice from 
many sources. But, it was stressed, it is the 
decision that matters.
The significance of the context 
provided by seven-day, 24-hour media 
attention was again emphasised. It is not 
only data that is in the public arena that 
matters; it is the interpretation of that 
data that has an impact. There is always 
a risk of ‘yes/no’ conclusions being drawn 
from complex material.
Post-election briefings are an 
important vehicle of proactive advice. 
One view was that they had in recent 
years become ‘seriously diluted’ and could 
be construed as ‘political documents’. The 
Treasury’s statutory obligations under 
the fiscal responsibility provisions of the 
Public Finance Act exemplify the public 
provision of key policy material. Do 
departments require ministerial approval 
to release reports? Free and frank advice 
is about content not process.
Discussion returned to the costs of 
administering the OIA, and a strong 
plea was made to move to the automatic 
release of information, thus reducing the 
room for discretion.
Rounding off the consideration of the 
OIA’s impact on free and frank advice, 
the point was made that a strength 
of the New Zealand system lies in its 
informal nature. Crucial to the provision 
of quality policy advice is the element 
of trust among those involved – a point 
repeated throughout the discussion – and 
trust requires a confidential relationship 
between ministers and officials. There is 
a case for underlining this in the OIA 
(after all, the courts do not expose all 
their drafts).
The short and long term
A frequently-expressed concern about the 
advice process is ministers’ preoccupation 
with the short term and a consequent lack 
of priority for the medium and long terms. 
How can this tension be reconciled?
A strong view was expressed in support 
of greater involvement of the community 
in policy making. This went beyond the 
standard consultation: citizens want ‘in’. 
This requires a reduction in the ‘privilege 
of the executive’ in respect of both research 
and policy advice. It was observed that 
some necessary research does not proceed 
because the ‘minister was not interested’. 
Officials find ways of other sources of 
advice getting to ministers. Technological 
change is relevant to greater community 
involvement.
It was observed that ‘the truth was 
hard to find’. Policy advice usually 
requires a trade-off. The meta-policy 
role earlier discussed is the key. But the 
point was later made that officials have 
an obligation to provide free and frank 
advice about how ministers exercise their 
discretion in choosing among different 
streams of advice.
An important distinction was 
made. Research should be value-free; 
policy advice brings values into play. 
Independence in research is essential. It 
should also be acknowledged that there 
are gaps in knowledge and that the effects 
of policy options are uncertain. It is 
necessary to identify what we don’t know. 
The notion of risk is central; but there are 
different meanings of risk: mathematical 
risk, political risk. The underpinning of 
policy by evidence is basic.
Ministers are sometimes confronted 
with ongoing policy research from 
departments that is outside the ambit of 
the government of the day. Where is the 
boundary between work commissioned 
by the minister and inherited projects? 
One response was that as long as major 
resources are not involved, departments 
should continue with such work.
One interpretation of the role played 
by the department in considering various 
streams of advice – meta-advice – is that 
it should appear to be disinterested: it 
is a broker rather than a monopoly. A 
risk in this stance is that the department 
risks losing depth in its own capacity. It 
is necessary for the department to have 
contact with the other sources of advice. 
Another relevant factor is the place of 
ministerial advisers. Given the ‘media 
pressure for rapid response’, private 
offices could ‘get in the way’.
Free and frank advice is an art 
requiring a high degree of sophistication. 
Time and effort had to be devoted to 
building relationships. The key elements 
are trust, confidence and respect.
The environment in which 
governments operate now moves so 
fast that strategic thinking about the 
medium and long terms could get lost 
in the system (but the example of such 
countries as Norway with comprehensive 
economic planning was mentioned).
Several points about research were 
highlighted. Research covers a ‘multitude 
of activities’: they need to be unbundled. 
The importance of quality evaluation 
was stressed. This is ‘research looking 
A salutary message to policy advisers is to ‘avoid 
folly’ – to seek to avoid unintended consequences 
and to advise on the prospect of policy succeeding 
in achieving the desired outcomes. 
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backwards’. Too many RFPs (requests 
for proposal) for evaluation are a waste 
of time because of initial bad design. 
Research and development is about 
informing public policy, not advising.
Experience shows that too often policy 
is blamed for inadequate outcomes. In 
fact, the weaknesses may lie elsewhere: 
for example, in implementation or 
structures. 
The public service’s stewardship role
The public service has responsibility 
for the stewardship of the public policy 
process. It is not an ‘independent actor’, 
but chief executives may ‘judiciously’ lead 
public debate on long-term issues, such 
as the age of entitlement for New Zealand 
Superannuation.
A view was strongly expressed that the 
traditional model of the policy process 
is out of date. Policy advice still looks 
‘monopolistic’. The public service has 
the capacity to ‘narrow down’ the public 
debate. Recognition should be given to the 
contribution of Crown entities charged 
with advising on medium- and long-term 
issues  (e.g., the retirement commissioner, 
the Productivity Commission). Others, 
such as ACC, interact with citizens whose 
voice is too often ‘choked off ’. The model 
needs attention.
‘Balanced, fair and factual’ is a more 
accurate representation of quality policy 
advice than ‘free and frank’.
The relationship between ministers 
and chief executives was again raised as 
a central issue. 
A respected administrative leader is 
not necessarily a trusted policy adviser. 
Is the ‘partnership’ description still 
accurate? The place of ministerial advisers 
was again mentioned. It is their job to 
manage the public service in the interests 
of the government. Chief executives 
have an obligation to manage the policy 
process within departments. This implies 
the need for a close relationship with the 
chief ministerial adviser, not only with 
the minister.
The pluralism of sources was also 
returned to and the claim made that 
departments have not sufficiently adapted. 
As an example, too many officials do 
not understand how business works: for 
example, about the importance of time 
frames in such areas as disclosure to the 
stock exchange. Another area requiring 
attention is the provision of advice to 
Parliament.
The public service – and the policy 
process – have an obligation to look to the 
long term, for instance in acknowledging 
the future needs of the young people of 
today. Where advice is ‘written to order’ 
it risks leading to ‘evidence-free’ papers. 
Where there is a void in the knowledge, 
officials tend to play safe.
Reference was made to a claimed 
‘heroic age’ in the place of official 
advisers. The case of Minister of Justice 
Ralph Hanan and Secretary of Justice 
John Robson in the 1960s was mentioned, 
as was the writing of Robert Parker 
(Parker, 1993).2 As Allen Schick pointed 
out in 1996, it is crucial to get right the 
relationship between ownership and 
purchase (Schick, 1996).
Experience showed that the ability to 
provide successive ministers with quality 
advice is founded on the long-term work 
of the department. An example was cited 
of rebuilding departmental capacity so 
that it could take a 99-year view. The 
platform on which policy advice is 
delivered is also important. The example 
of the Land and Water Forum was again 
commended. The parties called in to 
participate in policy-making respect the 
process.
A salutary message to policy advisers 
is to ‘avoid folly’ – to seek to avoid 
unintended consequences and to advise 
on the prospect of policy succeeding 
in achieving the desired outcomes. 
Ministers need to be able to judge the 
reliability of the knowledge on which 
departmental advice is based, and officials 
should be able to express an opinion 
about the choices before ministers. 
There is a professional vocation of policy 
advice. (And the point was made that 
ministers can advise too: ‘free and frank 
advice works both ways.) The timing 
and presentation of policy advice is also 
crucial.
Conclusion
There was a general conclusion that the 
discussion had been worthwhile. There 
was room to develop further the issues 
that were raised. The publication of the 
Law Commission’s report on the Official 
Information Act 1982 and the awaited 
tabling of amendments to the State Sector 
Act 1988 could provide opportunities to 
resume the discussion.
1 http://www.landandwater.org.nz.
2 Robert Parker taught at Victoria University and at the 
Australian National University, and was a leading figure in 
the New Zealand Institute of Public Administration in the 
1940s and 1950s.
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